ci: the agent's version and publish run only on the server's runner, the release key sealed with a key only it has #137
No reviewers
Labels
No labels
kind
bug
kind
chore
kind
docs
kind
feature
kind
performance
kind
question
priority
critical
priority
high
priority
low
risk
high
risk
low
risk
medium
status
blocked
status
confirmed
status
duplicate
status
invalid
status
needs-info
status
wontfix
ci: approved
No milestone
No project
No assignees
1 participant
Notifications
Due date
No due date set.
Dependencies
No dependencies set
Reference
MagicBeanDev/Beanstalk!137
Loading…
Reference in a new issue
No description provided.
Delete branch "HumanBean/Beanstalk:ci/sealed-release-key"
Deleting a branch is permanent. Although the deleted branch may continue to exist for a short time before it actually gets removed, it CANNOT be undone in most cases. Continue?
Summary
A runner gets every secret the repository and the organization have for each job it takes (forks' pull requests excepted), not only the secrets that job reads. So a runner lent by someone else, which takes
ubuntu-latestjobs, got Beanstalk'sRELEASE_SIGNING_KEYwith every push it built. The same goes for Longshot and the launcher: Longshot #2123, LongshotLauncher #241.versionand Sign and publish now ask for labeldeploy, which only the server's quick runner carries.RELEASE_SIGNING_KEY_SEALEDand open it with the server'sseal.key, which only that runner lets a job mount. That's SHA256SUMS, signed and the permanent links. The sealing is the same as Longshot'sscripts/ci_secret.sh. It's a repository secret, so it takes the place of the organization's (Longshot's) key of the same name. A runner withoutseal.keysigns nothing.docs/deploy.mdand.forgejo/actionlint.yamlupdated (actionlint gets labeldeploy).RELEASE_SIGNING_KEY_SEALEDis already set: Beanstalk's key, sealed on the server's runner by a one-off job (deleted since). The plainRELEASE_SIGNING_KEYis still in the repository's secrets. Delete it once this merges.Testing
Tested: the same
deploylabel, container and volume, and the sameopensslsettings, ran onunraid-quick-1today, and the key sealed and opened again byte for byte. Nothing else ran; the change was checked by reading it.Still to test:
unraid-quick-1and passes bothverifysteps (by hand, in the run's log).Risks
If the secret or the server's runner were missing, a release would stop at SHA256SUMS, signed. Nothing would be published wrongly. Reverting is enough.
🤖 Generated with Claude Code
WIP: ci: the agent's version and publish run only on the server's runner, the release key sealed with a key only it hasto ci: the agent's version and publish run only on the server's runner, the release key sealed with a key only it has